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incomplete treatment. The practitioner is urged to read the case
thoroughly. His pleading burdens may be substantially relieved if
he keeps in mind the admonitory words that Foley directs at
anyone who would ask the court to dismiss the pleading upon any
showing that does not manifest how its defects-whatever they be
prejudice him. If Foley is adhered to, the fear of the pleading
draftsmen will be a thing of the past so long as the pleading gives
basic notice to the other party of what it is that the pleader
complains of.
Hypothetical Pleading- Indemnity
In a recent case,8 5 a retailer brought an action against a doll
manufacturer for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability.
The plaintiff alleged that he was being sued in Connecticut on
behalf of an infant who sustained an eye injury while playing with
a doll purchased in one of the plaintiff's stores. The complaint
indicated that the retailer had denied the allegations in the Connecticut suit, but that if liability should be adjudged against plaintiff
(as defendant in that suit), he would be entitled to be indemnified
by the doll manufacturer because ultimate fault would be in its
breach of implied warranty in the manufacture of said doll. The
appellate division, in reversing the lower court decision, held that
the complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action for breach of
implied warranty 86even though the cause of action was hypothetically pleaded.

At common law hypothetical pleadings were subject to demurrer on the grounds of indefiniteness and uncertainty.8 7 Even under
the CPA, hypothetical pleadings were frowned upon by the
courts, 8 with bur few exceptions. 89 The court in the instant case
read quite liberally Rule 3014 of the CPLR, which permits
causes of action or defenses to be pleaded hypothetically. It sustained the complaint even though it did not unequivocally assert
a present breach of the warranty. The court merely subjected
the hypothetical pleading to a "good faith" test and found that
the existence or non-existence of the breach was a fact concerning
which the plaintiff had pleaded with "honesty and good faith." 9'
85 W. T. Grant Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co., supra note 71.
8 Id. at 362-63, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 430-31.
87 Stroock Publishing Co. v. Talcott, 129 App. Div. 14, 113 N.Y. Supp.
214 (2d Dep't 1908).
88General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Bayer Co., 305 N.Y. 479, 113 N.E.2d
844 (1953); Lazar v. Steinberg, 269 App. Div. 760, 54 N.Y.S.2d 859 (2d
Dep't 1945).
89 Polstein v. Smith, 239 App. Div. 724, 268 N.Y. Supp. 617 (1st Dep't
1934); R & L Goldmuntz Sprl v. Fischer, 57 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct.
1945).
90 W. T. Grant Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co., supra note 71, at 363, 243
N.Y.S.2d at 430-31.
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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE

The dissent argued that the cause of action pleaded was one
for indemnification and as such was prematurely brought since it
would not accrue until there was an actual- and satisfied - judgment on behalf of the infant against the retailer in the Connecticut
action. It would seem that even though the action be viewed as
one for indemnification it could nonetheless be allowable by simple
analogy to an impleader cause of action, which may be asserted
when a party is or may be liable to the pleading party."'
An impleader cause of action in New York is one for indemnity, and though an indemnity cause of action does not accrue until
actual payment by the third-party plaintiff of any judgment recovered against him, impleader traditionally permits assertion of
the indemnity claim on a hypothetical basis (i.e., without it being
certain that there will be anything for which the third-party plaintiff would have to be indemnified).
Thus, even though there is no express statutory authorization
for permitting such a premature independent action for idemnification, the action may be permitted by a liberal construction of the
CPLR as required by section 104, and a liberal construction of the
pleadings as authorized by section 3026.92 Furthermore, the court
after allowing the complaint, can either stay the proceedings until
the Connecticut action culminates or continue the action, but stay
any judgment until the Connecticut action is completed, thereby
insuring that defendant's rights will not be prejudiced. There was
obviously a jurisdictional problem involved in this case, in that
the other action, pending in Connecticut, was beyond the control
of the New York courts. The case was distinguished on that
ground by another case,9 3 which indicated that an independent indemnity claim will not be allowed before its technical accrual when
jurisdictional problems are not present.
Pleading Special Damages-Itemization
Rule 3015(d) of the CPLR requires that special damages be
itemized. Although the rule is new, there is some indication that
it merely codifies the existing case law which recognizes a distinction between general damages 94 which need not be pleaded with
91 CPLR § 1007.
92 Section 3026 provides: "Pleadings shall be liberally construed. Defects
shall be ignored if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced." Ultimately, the significance of the instant case lies not so much. in the construction it has given hypothetical pleadings, but rather in the further
indication that the first department stands ready to construe pleadings liberally
in order to allow a plaintiff with an honest claim his day in court.
93 Morey v. Sealright Co., 247 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
94 General damages are such as are naturally presumed to follow from
the injuries alleged. 4 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES § 1261 (9th ed. 1912).

